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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Kevin Scott Dias appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction entered 
pursuant to a conditional guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence.  This reply brief is necessary to address the State’s claim that the search did 
not exceed the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent because, prior to asking if he could “just 
take a quick look” in Mr. Dias’s car, Officer Miller asked Mr. Dias whether there was 
contraband in the car.  Mr. Dias asserts that this question did not prove that the 
subsequent search was within the scope of his consent because a reasonable person 
would not have understood that consent to the officer just taking a quick look in the car 
would result in a search of closed containers. 
    
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Dias’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 





The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dias’s Motion To Suppress 
  
The State claims that “Officer Miller asked Dias if he could search the car.”  
(Respondent’s Brief, p. 9.)  This is inaccurate.  Officer Miller did not ask if he could 
“search.”  He asked if he could take “just take a quick look” in the car.  (Audio at 13:35 – 
13:45.)  Thus, the issue in this case is whether a consent to “just a quick look” is a 
knowing and voluntary consent to a full search.  The fact that Officer Miller asked 
whether there was “weed” or “anything illegal” in the car before he asked to “just take a 
quick look” did not magically transform Officer Miller’s question into a request to search.  
The State has no response to Mr. Dias’s argument that the expression “just take a quick 
look” does not mean “search.”  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.)  And it ignores the fact 
that the United States Supreme Court has never said that the “scope of a quick look is 
defined by its expressed object.”  The State avoids this elephant in the room by implying 
that the only important aspect to the totality analysis here is the fact that Officer Miller 
asked about “weed.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  This is not a proper totality analysis of 
the scope of consent, and it is not supported by Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).  
The reasoning in Jimeno is based on an officer’s specific request to “search.”  Id. at 
249. 
Further, Officer Miller’s question about what may have been in the car was not as 
specific as the State argues.  As the State makes very clear, Officer Miller mentioned 
“weed.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  But Officer Miller also asked whether there was 
“anything illegal” at all in the car.  This was a general question.  Therefore, the State’s 
assertion that “’[w]eed’ was the expressed object of Officer Miller’s request to search” is 
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not accurate.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  In reality, the expressed object of his search 
was “anything illegal.”  Reasonable people know that law enforcement officers are 
always on the lookout for something illegal.  Therefore, Officer Miller’s question did not 
make it clear that he would be specifically looking for drugs when he entered the car. 
The State claims State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1999) “controls the 
outcome here.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.12.)  The analysis, however, in Frizzel—as In 
Jimeno—was based on an officer’s request to “search.”  Id. at 524.  But the facts of this 
case are different, and that is the precise issue.  The State tries to sidestep this problem 
by again misstating the facts.  It states, “Officer Miller asked if Dias’ car had any drugs 
in it, and Dias consented to a search.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.12.)  This is not true.  It is 
circular.  Mr. Dias consented to a “quick look.”  Therefore, Frizzel does not control the 
outcome of this case.         
The State also appears to object to the idea that—based on the words used to 
ask for consent,—a suspect’s consent can be general or limited.  (Respondent’s Brief, 
pp.12-13.)  It says, “Creating an arbitrary distinction between ‘general consent’ and 
‘non-general consent’ would undermine the reasonableness of the existing standard for 
measuring the scope of consent.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.13.)  It is axiomatic, however, 
that some consents are general and some are limited.  Otherwise, there would be no 
reason to analyze the scope of consent.  Thus, such a distinction actually is the 
“existing standard.”  Jimeno held that a suspect can “delimit” the scope of a search by 
making it clear exactly what he is consenting to when an officer asks to search.  Jimeno, 
500 U.S. at 252.  This would obviously be a “non-general” consent.  The same logic 
applies when an officer uses an expression that doesn’t communicate that he will be 
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performing a search.  A request to “just take a quick look” communicates that the 
officer’s actions will be limited to that request.  This was the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ point in United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (2000).   When an 
officer asks to do something other than search, the suspect’s consent is limited much 
like it would be if an officer actually asked to search, and the suspect said, “You can 
search the passenger area but not my backpack.” 
Therefore, when Mr. Dias consented to Officer Miller asking if he could “just take 
a quick look” in the car, the scope of Mr. Dias’s consent was limited to just that.  The 
reasonable person, regardless of whether an officer first asked whether there was weed 
or anything illegal in the car, would not believe that consent to such a request would 
result in the officer ultimately opening and searching closed containers. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dias respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of 
judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 12th day of August, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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